Introduction
There is considerable evidence of an increase in the wage premium associated with skill for workers in the United States and many OECD countries since (at least) the 1980's. In the United States, for example, Katz and Autor (1999) estimate that the real wages of high school drop-outs, the least skilled workers, fell over the 1963-1995 period (by about -4.5 percent), while the real wages of university graduates rose sharply (by about 22.4 percent). Most of the change appears to have been concentrated in the first half of the 1980's: Card and DiNardo (2002) show a deceleration in the skill wage gap since then, including in the second half of the 1990's. There is some disagreement about the underlying causes of these changes, in particular about the extent to which they are driven by changes in the relative supply of workers with different amounts of education, or changes in the relative demand for these workers (for example, Katz and Murphy 1992; Katz and Autor 1999; Autor, Katz, and Krueger, 1998; Card and DiNardo, 2002; Card and Lemieux, 2001) . Still, most authors believe that changes in demand favoring the skilled are responsible for a substantial fraction of the observed changes in relative wages.
Changes in relative demand favoring skilled workers in industrialized countries could be driven by a number of factors: Skill-biased technological change (SBTC), Heckscher-Ohlin effects of trade, labor market reform, or outsourcing are all potential candidates. Here too there is some controversy about the relative importance of competing explanations (for example , Wood 1994; Feenstra and Hanson 1996; DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux 1996; Berman, Bound, and Machin 1998; Machin and Van Reenen 1998; Autor, Katz, and Krueger 1998) . The bulk of the evidence suggests, however, that skill-biased technological change is an important factor.
Evidence of changes in the demand for workers with different amounts of skill from developing countries is more scarce. In this paper, we consider the evolution of relative wages in five Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. These are the countries with the five largest economies in the region. Jointly, they accounted for 85 percent of the GDP and 70 percent of the population of Latin America and the Caribbean in 2000. We use repeated cross-sections of household surveys, and decompose the evolution of relative wages into factors associated with changes in relative supply and relative demand. The main conclusions of the paper are three. First, increases in the relative wages of the most skilled (university-educated) workers took place concurrently with increases in their relative abundance in all of the countries in our sample except Brazil. This is strong evidence of increases in the demand for skilled workers. Second, increases in the wage bill of skilled workers occurred largely within sectors, and in the same sectors in different countries. This is consistent with skill-biased technological change, although similar patterns of labor market reform across countries could also account for some of the observed changes. Third, trade appears to be an important transmission mechanism.
Increases in the demand for the most skilled workers took place at a time when countries in Latin America considerably increased the penetration of imports, including imports of capital goods.
We show that changes in the volume and R&D intensity of imports are significantly related to changes in the demand for more skilled workers in Latin America.
Our results complement earlier empirical and theoretical work on the relationship between trade, technology, and relative wages in developing countries. Berman, Bound and Machin (1998) and Machin (2000a and 2000b) use United Nations data for a sample of developed and developing countries on industry shares of production and non-production workers to argue that there has been pervasive skill-biased technological change around the world, including in middle-income countries. In Latin America, papers based on firm-level data for Chile (Pavcnik 2002) and Colombia (Kugler 2002) suggest a complementary relationship between skill-upgrading and adoption of new technology by firms, although the direction of causality is not always clear. Two recent studies based on household data for a large number of countries (Behrman, Birdsall, and Szekely 2001; Inter-American Development Bank 2002) show an increase in the wages of university graduates relative to secondary school graduates in Latin America, and argue that some of the observed changes could be explained by trade reform. 1 In addition to these cross-country studies, recent papers on Colombia (Attanasio, Goldberg, and Pavcnik 2002) and Brazil (Pavcnik, Blom, Goldberg, and Schady 2002) both attribute an important role to skill-biased technological change transferred through trade as an explanation for the observed changes in the wage distribution. Finally, theoretical work by Acemoglu (2003) shows that trade opening could induce an increase in the skill-bias of technological change because trade increases the relative price of skill-intensive products in the North, where R&D is conducted. Insofar as these new technologies are then transferred to the South, trade opening could also increase wage differences between skilled and unskilled workers there.
Our results also have important policy implications. Keller (2002) argues that the positive impact of technology diffusion on productivity affects the optimal policy stance of a country. It stands to reason, however, that the technology that is transferred from the North will not be factor-neutral in nature. Skill-biased technologies can worsen income inequalities but, 1 Both studies have limitations: First, they are based on a large number of countries (18) but a small number of surveys per country (in half the countries in the analysis there are three surveys or less), raising the possibility that the estimates reflect, at least in part, levels differences across countries. Second, these papers do not explicitly address changes in the supply of workers with different amounts of education which could themselves account for the observed changes in wage premia.
because they increase the returns to education, they may also provide an incentive for workers to acquire more schooling. Like the effects on productivity, the effects of technology transmission on relative wages should be taken into account by policy-makers in the South making choices about the pattern and speed of trade opening.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we briefly discuss our data sources. Section 3 presents descriptive evidence on the evolution of relative wages and the relative supply of workers with different amounts of education. In section 4, we identify aggregate demand shifts. Section 5 shows that changes in the wage bill for skilled workers take place largely within sectors, and in the same sectors in different countries. In Section 6 we explore the connection between changes in relative demand, relative wages, and trade. We also briefly discuss competing explanations for the observed changes which emphasize labor market reform, or changes in the relative quality of education. Section 7 concludes.
The data
The analysis in this paper is based on individual-level data from labor force surveys for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico. Table 1 provides some details on the data sources, their sampling frequency, and the periods covered by each of them. In keeping with much earlier work, where data are collected more than once a year (Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico), we simply append data from the different rounds of a survey within a year, treating multiple surveys as a single survey. We also treat the data as a series of repeated cross-sections, even though some of the surveys (Argentina and Mexico) include a rotating panel. Table 2 reports the mean sample size, as well as the minimum and maximum for each of the surveys. The table shows wide variation: The largest surveys are carried out in Brazil (with a sample size of more than 150,000 observations per year), and Mexico (about 50,000); sample sizes are much smaller in Colombia (about 10,000), Argentina and Chile (about 2,000 each). In every instance, the surveys are limited to urban areas. In Argentina and Chile, the coverage includes only Buenos Aires and Santiago, respectively, while the coverage in Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico includes most of the larger cities.
For most of our calculations, we restrict the sample to individuals aged 25-60, and include both females and males. Surprisingly, comparable calculations which were limited to males only were qualitatively very similar to those for both genders-this, in spite of the much lower labor market participation of women, and the much higher variability in female participation. Finally, we limit the sample to all workers who are salaried and employed-that is, all those who report earning a wage, regardless of whether they are in the formal or informal sectors. The analysis does not include the self-employed, as it is not clear that the wage is a particularly meaningful concept for this group. Table 3 gives the summary statistics for the fraction unemployed, and the fraction of the employed who are salaried, by education category. Salaried workers make up about two-thirds of all workers in urban areas in the five countries in our sample. Figure 1 shows that the ratio of salaried tertiary equivalents to salaried secondary equivalents is roughly unity in all countries, and has not changed noticeably over the period covered in our analysis-see below for a definition of education equivalents. Unemployment is generally higher among secondary than tertiary equivalents in all countries other than Mexico, and the relative unemployment rate is highly
cyclical. An important message from Figure 1 is that tertiary equivalents enjoy both higher wages and lower unemployment rates, so it does not appear that they are compensated with high (or rising) wages because of their high (or rising) unemployment rates.
Construction of education groups: Much of the analysis in the paper is concerned with differences in the supply and wage levels of workers with different amounts of education, when these workers are grouped into categories. This raises a number of questions. First, education systems vary across countries, so that a person who has completed secondary school in Chile has not necessarily spent the same number of years in school as a person who has completed secondary school in Mexico. Table 4 summarizes the number of years within a given education cycle for each of the countries in our analysis.
A second issue that deserves attention is the way in which we assign individuals to education groups. In the literature for developing countries, this is commonly done according to partial or full completion of a certain education level. For instance, a person with seven years of education in Mexico would be assigned to the primary school category if the criterion were completion of a cycle, but to the secondary school category if the criterion were some schooling within a cycle.
In this paper we have opted for an alternative method of classification that essentially combines the two described above. Specifically, we assign individuals to two different education groups: The group corresponding to the highest education level they have completed and the group corresponding to the next education level they can complete. We construct weights that reflect the individual's relative progress between both education levels.
This procedure can best be illustrated with an example. Consider again an individual with seven years of education in Mexico. As described above, this person will have completed her primary studies plus one year of secondary studies, and will therefore be included in both the primary education and secondary education groups. Notice that secondary school requires a total of six years of schooling in Mexico, out of which she has only completed one. This implies that she has completed one sixth of secondary school. We therefore give her a weight of 1/6 when including her in the secondary education group and a weight of 5/6 (1-1/6) when including her in the primary education group. Similarly, a person with four years of education in Brazil would be given a weight of ½ to the no education and primary education groups each, while a person with twelve years of education in Chile would be given a weight of one in the secondary education group and zero in the tertiary group. By weighting all of our observations in this way, we transform the data into primary, secondary, and tertiary equivalents.
There are two reasons why this seems to us a preferable way of assigning workers to schooling categories. First, in many Latin American countries large shares of the population have only a few years of education. Restricting the analysis to only those individuals who have actually completed at least one education level would therefore discard a significant fraction of the population. Similarly, assigning these individuals to the no education group would also be misleading, since most of them do have some education. Second, a substantial amount of the educational progress that takes place in developing countries over time occurs within rather than between levels. We would miss this skill upgrading altogether if we were simply to assign workers to education categories corresponding to the levels they have completed or begun. Our procedure, by contrast, accounts for these within-category changes with changes in the weights.
2 Table 5 summarizes the fractions of the population aged 25 to 60 who are primary school, secondary school, and tertiary equivalents, by country and year. (Tertiary education includes all formal post-secondary schooling, regardless of whether this was acquired in university or technical schools). The table shows that the distribution of education in the population was generally comparable across countries, except for Chile, which had better schooling outcomes (in particular, a larger fraction of the population who were secondary school equivalents), and Brazil, which had worse schooling outcomes (in particular, a larger fraction of primary school equivalents). In general, one-third to one-half of the population are primary equivalents, another third are secondary school equivalents (with the exceptions of Brazil and Chile), and one-fifth to one-quarter are tertiary equivalents. In all of the countries in the sample there is clear evidence of skill upgrading: The fraction of primary equivalents diminishes, and the fractions of secondary and tertiary equivalents increase over time. As a check, we also present data on the fractions of the population in these countries who have some education within a level, based on the international data from Barro and Lee (2000) . These figures cannot be compared strictly to our estimates, because of differences in data sources, in the way in which the education groups were computed, and (critically) because the Barro and Lee data purport to be representative of both the urban and rural sectors in a country. Still, as Table 6 shows, the patterns in Barro and Lee are reasonably similar to those from the labor force survey data, showing lower levels of education in Brazil, and skill upgrading in all of the countries in our sample.
Trends in relative wage and supply measures by education level
We start our analysis by looking at trends in the evolution of relative wages and relative supplies by education groups, focusing on the comparisons between tertiary and secondary equivalents, and between secondary and primary equivalents. After grouping workers into education categories, we calculate relative wages for education groups i and j in year t as the difference in their average (log) hourly wages:
(1) W t i,j = log (hourly wage) it -log (hourly wage) jt , where i=tertiary or secondary, and j=secondary or primary, respectively. Similarly, we calculate the relative supply in year t as the ratio of the percentage share of groups i and j among those employed in salaried jobs:
(2) S t i,j = (% education level i of salaried workers in year t) / (% education level j of salaried workers in year t)
We then discuss our findings in the context of a simple supply-demand framework.
A concern with simple estimates of the relationship between relative wages and relative supply based on equations (1) and (2) is the changing composition of the workforce. The five countries in our sample are relatively advanced in their demographic transitions. The fraction of workers who are older is therefore higher in later than in earlier years. Older workers generally earn more than younger workers, and a life-cycle model of earnings determination suggests that the wage gap between more and less educated workers should also increase with age (Mincer 1974; Heckman, Lochner, and Todd 1998) . The increase in the relative wage of the skilled we observe could, therefore, be a product not of the changing supply or demand for educated workers, but rather of the changing age profile. Many countries in Latin America are also witnessing important changes in the participation of women in the labor force. If the difference in wages by education is larger (or smaller) for women than for men, this too could distort uncorrected estimates of relative wages.
Following Katz and Murphy (1992) we correct for compositional changes in the labor force by holding constant other characteristics-in our case, gender and age (in five-year brackets). Specifically, for any education group, we calculate the average share of total employment which is given by workers in 14 age-gender cells over the entire period. We then use these weights to calculate mean wages for an education group in any given year. This procedure holds constant the age and gender composition of the workforce, so that the observed changes can more convincingly be attributed to demand or supply factors determining the relative wage.
3 In practice, however, the corrected relative supply and wage series are very similar to those which do not take into account changes in composition.
Relative wages and supply of tertiary and secondary equivalents: The five panels in Figure 2 graph the measures of relative supply and relative wages of tertiary and secondary equivalents. Since our sample sizes are relatively small, in particular in Argentina and Chile, and especially when we consider tertiary equivalents, we graph three-year moving averages for the values of relative supply and wages in a given year. All series have been normalized, so that the relative wages and relative supplies are given a value of 100 in the first year for which data are available. Figure 2 shows that in all of the countries in the sample except Chile the wages of tertiary equivalents rise steadily relative to those of secondary equivalents. In spite of these common patterns, however, Figure 2 shows that the magnitude of changes in relative wages which makes the magnitude of the change in relative wages there even more remarkable. In the other countries the relative supply of tertiary equivalents increased by little in Colombia (7.2%), and moderately in Chile (16.9%) and Argentina (25%). In Brazil, the relative supply of tertiary equivalents fell by 7.3%, a change which can be explained by increases in the workforce with secondary education. Increases in relative wages which coincide with increases in relative supply are highly suggestive of demand-side changes favoring the most skilled workers. Indeed, these patterns suggest that the demand-side shifts towards tertiary equivalents would have to be so large as to more than offset the downward pressure on wages which results from their increasing relative supply. Only in Brazil is it at least possible that the change in the relative wage over the period is driven entirely by changes in relative supply. 4 Relative wages and supply of secondary and primary equivalents: Although this paper is concerned primarily with the evolution of relative wages of tertiary and secondary equivalents, Table 7 presents calculations for the Gini coefficient of monthly wages for the five countries in our sample. 6 In Argentina, where the biggest change over the period appears to be an increase in the earnings of primary equivalents (relative to secondary equivalents), the earnings Gini is lower in the 1990's than in the 1980's. In Brazil, we see only small changes in the Gini, which is not unexpected given the small changes in relative wages. In Colombia, a comparison of the results for 1985-90 and 1990-95 suggests that the period with the most dramatic increase in the relative wages of tertiary equivalents coincides with a sharp increase in the Gini. In Mexico, the Gini increases steadily over time, which is not surprising given the increase in the earnings of both tertiary equivalents (relative to secondary equivalents) and secondary equivalents (relative to primary equivalents). In Chile, finally, there were large increases in the Gini in the late 1970's and in the 1980's, and a decrease in the 1990's, so that by the late 1990's the Gini was only marginally higher than it had been in the late 1970's, and significantly lower than in the 1980's.
Changes in the Gini are particularly important given the already very high levels of inequality in many Latin American countries. 5 In the United States, the increase in the returns to schooling has occurred concurrently with sharp increases in the returns to experience, and in the unexplained (or residual) wage inequality (Katz and Murphy 1992; Juhn, Murphy and Pierce 1993) . To test for this possibility in our sample of countries, we run country-specific regressions of log(w it ) = α + β t S it + γ t E it + ε it , where log(w it ) is log hourly wages, S it is an unrestricted set of dummies for years of education, E it is an unrestricted set of dummies for years of experience, and t takes on values of 1 around 1980 (corresponding to the 1979-81 surveys in Chile, and the 1982-84 surveys in Brazil and Colombia), 2 around 1990 (corresponding to the 1989-91 surveys in all countries), and 3 around 2000 (corresponding to the latest three surveys in all countries). We graph the coefficients γ t , but find no consistent change in the experience profiles over time. Similarly, when we graph the log wage residuals at the 90 th , 50 th and 10 th percentiles of the distribution, we find no increase in the dispersion, suggesting (puzzlingly) that there has not been an increase in the returns to unobserved ability for the five countries in our sample. 6 We also calculated the Gini of hourly wages, which corresponds to our measure of relative wages. These results, which are not reported but are available from the authors upon request, are qualitatively very similar to those for monthly wages. In general, however, the changes in the Gini are larger for monthly wages because changes in hourly wages over time tend to be positively correlated with changes in hours worked for the countries in our sample. For example, mean hours worked for the lowest 30% of the earnings distribution are lower in 1995-99 than in 1985-90 in every country in our sample except Mexico, and higher for the highest 30 percent of the distribution in every country in our sample except Argentina and Chile.
Identifying demand effects on changes in relative wages
In the remainder of the paper, we focus on the wages and employment shares of tertiary equivalents relative to secondary equivalents only. To assess the magnitude of the demand changes favoring tertiary equivalents, we follow Katz and Murphy (1992) . In a simple supplydemand model, and under the assumption of a constant elasticity of substitution (CES), relative wages have to satisfy the condition:
where w 1 (t)/w 2 (t) is the ratio of relative wages, x 1 (t)/x 2 (t) is the ratio of relative supplies, σ is the elasticity of substitution between workers in the two education levels, and D(t) is the time series of relative demand shifts. The economy is assumed to be operating on the demand curve, and supply is taken to be perfectly inelastic in the short run. Both D(t) and σ are unknown parameters. As Katz and Murphy show, a working value of σ can be estimated if the demand side shifts are taken to be linear by running a regression of the (log) relative wages on the (log)
relative supplies and a time trend. With this procedure, Katz and Murphy obtain an estimate of σ which is 1.41 in the United States. They then re-arrange terms in (3) to obtain:
Since all of the parameters on the right-hand side of (4) are now given, this can in theory be used to estimate demand-side shifts.
In the United States data, identification of the parameter σ conditional on the time trend D is possible because of clearly non-linear patterns in both the measure of relative wages log[w 1 (t)/w 2 (t)] and the measure of relative supply log [x 1 (t)/x 2 (t)]. Unfortunately, this is not the case for any of the countries in our sample-rather, all of the series are rising (or falling) almost monotonically. As a result, our estimates of σ conditional on a time trend are very imprecise (with t-statistics of one or lower), and often wildly improbable. (In Chile, for example, the estimated elasticity of substitution between tertiary equivalents and secondary equivalents is higher than 10, but the t-value is 0.2). In our calculations, we therefore follow the second approach outlined in Katz and Murphy, which estimates D(t) directly, under plausible values for σ. Specifically, we allow for values of σ between 1 and 3, which is the range of international estimates summarized in Katz and Autor (1999, p. 1521) . (The Cobb-Douglas production function corresponds to a value of σ of 1).
Aggregate demand shifts for tertiary equivalents: Figure 4 presents a series of graphs of D(t) for tertiary equivalents relative to secondary equivalents for the five countries in our sample, As with the relative wage series in Figure 2 , Figure 4 shows that the magnitude of the demand shifts favoring tertiary equivalents varied a great deal by country, and over time. To look at these patterns more carefully, America. It seems likely that some of the technological changes that account for the rising wage of skilled workers in OECD countries, in particular in the United States, were transmitted through trade, and helped determine the evolution of relative wages in Latin America. Since the 7 The countries in our sample present at least six important macroeconomic crises for the period for which we have wage data: Chile in 1972 -75, and again in 1982 -83, Argentina in 1988 -1990 , Brazil in 1981 -83, and again in 1990 -92, Colombia in 1999 , and Mexico in 1995 With the exception of the Mexican tequila crisis of 1995 and the Colombian recession of 1999, all of these crises have been associated with pronounced decreases in the relative demand for the most educated workers. Put differently, virtually all of the important downturns we observe in the relative demand for tertiary educated workers in the region are correlated with economic downturns. The only exceptions to this pattern are the decrease in relative wages for tertiary workers in Colombia in 1989-90, and the decrease in Chile in 1991-93. This finding is at odds with much of the existing literature which emphasizes the relative advantage of educated workers during macro-economic downturns (see, for example, World Bank 2001, and Glewwe and Hall 1998 for such an explanation applied to Peru).
technological changes in the United States were complementary with skill, we would expect that new technologies adopted in Latin America would also favor more educated workers. These complications notwithstanding, a critical prediction of an H-O Stolper-Samuelson type explanation is that economy-wide skill upgrading is a result of an increase in the relative size of skill-intensive sectors. This, in turn, increases the aggregate demand and the relative wage of skilled labor. Because skilled workers are now relatively more expensive, however, we would expect to see within-sector substitution away from skilled labor and into unskilled labor. By contrast, skill-biased technological change is consistent with within-sector increases in both the relative wage and employment share of skilled workers.
5.
A standard way of considering the importance of these competing explanations is to decompose the change in the aggregate wage bill, given by the product of employment and the wage, into between-and within industry components, as follows:
where St is the wage bill share of tertiary (skilled) workers defined as:
and W i is the wage bill share of industry i defined as:
where T and S are tertiary and secondary equivalents, respectively, W t and W s are the wages paid to these two groups, WB stands for wage bill, i is an industry index and an overstrike indicates an average between the initial and final periods considered. 10 We turn again to the household data for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, and disaggregate the wage and employment data into the greatest number of sectors possiblefrom 25 in Argentina to 75 in Mexico. The results from this decomposition are presented in Table 10 . Table 10 shows clearly that the bulk of the increase in the aggregate wage bill for tertiary equivalents took place within industries. The fractions vary by country. In Mexico, despite the greatest number of sectors in the data, which should allow for a more accurate measurement of shifts across sectors, fully 95 percent of the observed skill upgrading can be explained by within-sector changes. In Chile, the labor force survey data shows that just over 90 percent of the skill upgrading in the 1980's took place within sectors. Similar estimates based on firm-level data for Chile for the 1979-86 period suggest that 66 percent of the changes in the wage bill occurred within very detailed four-digit ISIC industries (Pavcnik 2002). Finally, calculations by Berman and Machin (2002b) based on a United Nations classification of industrial employment into non-production (skilled) and production (unskilled) workers for the 10 See Autor, Katz and Krueger 1998 , Katz and Autor 1999 , Berman, Bound, and Machin 1998 , and Berman and Machin 2000b 1980's show a similar pattern for the six Latin American countries for which data are available:
The proportion of the increase in the wage bill of non-production workers which takes place within industries is 51 percent in Uruguay, 62 percent in Venezuela, 69 percent in Guatemala, 84 percent in Colombia, 103 percent in Peru, and 153 percent in Chile.
The decompositions in Table 10 suggest that skill-biased technological change is a serious contender to explain the observed changes in real wages in Latin America.
11 Further evidence comes from the similarity of patterns of skill upgrading across countries. Insofar as skill-biased technological change is pervasive, we would expect to find a positive correlation between the degree of skill upgrading across sectors in different countries. In Table 11 , we present weighted correlations of the changes in the wage bill share of tertiary equivalents across sectors, similar to those found in Berman, Bound and Machin (1998 (Acemoglu and Zilibotti 2001) . Consider the implications of this: Despite profound differences in the productive structure of the five countries, skill upgrading at the tertiary level appears to have taken place in the same sectors. These results are highly suggestive of technological changes which affected some sectors more than others, and 11 Within-industry upgrading is also consistent with a complementary relationship between capital and skill together with a falling relative price of capital. Empirically, skilled labor and capital do appear to be complements (Berman, Bound, and Griliches 1994) . Capital is likely to have become relatively more abundant and cheaper in Latin America as a result of trade liberalization, rising FDI, and other developments which increased investment. A careful analysis of the changes in the use of skilled labor by Colombian firms between 1983 and 1998 which takes into account the effect of the changing price of capital, suggests that skill upgrading has been driven both by capital-skill and technology-skill complementarity (Kugler 2002). Berman and Machin (2002b) argue that the changes in the price of capital in Latin America and other developing countries appear to be much too small to account for the observed changes in demand for skilled workers. 12 Observations are weighted by the sector employment shares averaged over time and across countries, in a similar fashion to the correlations for industrialized countries presented in Berman, Bound, and Machin 1998. which were transmitted to Chile in the 1980's and to the other countries in the region in the 1990's.
Direct evidence of skill-biased technological change: Industry patterns of skill upgrading, trade, and the R&D intensity of imports
If skill-biased technologies developed in the North were transmitted to Latin America through trade, we would expect industries and countries with a high degree of import penetration, in particular imports which are intensive in new technologies to have a high degree of skill upgrading. Data on imports, and on the R&D content of these imports are available for three countries in our sample-Chile, Colombia, and Mexico-and only for the manufacturing sector. added and R&D, respectively, and a cij is the input-output coefficient (which measures the share of imports in industry j that is sold to industry i in country c). Data on import input-output flows are not available, so they are proxied by domestic input-output flows in the estimation. The North R&D stock can be thought of as a measure of import penetration by industry, when the imports are weighted by their R&D content. 14 13 We thank Marcelo Olarreaga, Maurice Schiff, and Yanling Wang for making these data available to us, Because of the smaller size of the Chilean data sets, the Chilean observations are two-year averages. 14 The data on R&D expenditures for these calculations in the North is available from the ANBERD 2000 (OECD) database; it covers 15 OECD countries from 1973 onwards, and is available at the two-, three-or four-digit level. Cumulative R&D stocks are computed from these flows using the perpetual inventory method with a 10 percent depreciation rate. The input-output matrices are derived from GTAP (1998), Finally, we follow Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister (1997) and disaggregate changes in the foreign R&D stock in an industry into changes in volume and changes in composition (increases in the R&D content of imports, holding constant the volume). Here too the measure of volume is given by import penetration, M j /VA j . The measure of trade composition, NRDcomposition, is defined as:
Note that the only difference between this measure and the measure of foreign R&D stock in (8) is the denominator in the expression in parentheses: The measure of NRDcomposition expresses all imports from a given OECD country k in industry j as a fraction of total imports to industry j, rather than as a fraction of value added in industry j. Put differently, because imports from a given country are normalized by total imports, the measure of NRDcomposition refers only to the source and R&D intensity of imports, abstracting from the volume, while the measure of NRDstock refers both to the volume and composition of imports. Mexico. The figure clearly shows large increases in both measures, but particularly in the measure of North R&D. Since the R&D stock is itself a function of import penetration and the R&D content of these imports, Figure 11 suggests that the R&D intensity of a given volume of imports increased in the 1980's and 1990's, at least in Chile and Colombia. Table 11 presents percentage changes in import penetration and in the R&D stock, by industry, between the first and last years for which data on import penetration, R&D stock, and labor force are all available (1981 -98 in Chile, 1982 -98 in Colombia, and 1987 . The table shows some common patterns across countries: For example, there are very large increases in import penetration in the textiles, clothing apparel, footwear and leather products sector in all three countries, and very large increases in the North R&D stock in the paper, printing and publishing and non-metallic products sectors in Chile and Colombia.
We next turn to regression analysis to estimate the effect of exposure to foreign technology on skill upgrading. We consider five different measures of skill upgrading: The relative wages, relative wage bill (defined, as before, as the product of employment and the while the bilateral openness are from World Bank databases-see Schiff, Wang and Olarreaga (2002) for details. The estimations take into account only the R&D of OECD countries because comparable data for middle-and low-income countries are not available. This is unlikely to be a problem, however, as well over 90 percent of total R&D in the world is conducted in eight OECD countries-namely Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. See Keller (2002, p. 10). wage), relative demand, and relative employment (separately, measured as the number of workers and the number of hours worked) of tertiary to secondary equivalents. In the first set of regressions, the explanatory variable is import penetration, in the second set of regressions the explanatory variable is the log of the North R&D stock, while the third set of regressions includes both the measure of import volume and import composition in industry i in country c at time t.
An obvious problem with our data is that all of the series-relative demand, wages, employment shares and import penetration-are trending upwards. A simple regression of any measure of skill upgrading on any measure of imports would therefore find a (likely spurious) association. We correct for this by removing a country-industry-specific linear trend from all of the series. The regressions also include country-industry-specific intercepts.
15 A second estimation problem is related to the possible endogeneity of our measures of import penetration.
This could happen, for example, if firms import more intermediate goods or more R&D-intensive intermediate goods precisely because they have an increased abundance of skilled workers. As a partial correction for this, we lag our measures of import penetration by one period. 16 All estimations are by GLS, and observations are weighted by employment in a given countryindustry-year cell.
Results are summarized in Table 13 . The top panel shows that increases in import penetration are consistently associated with skill upgrading-regardless whether this upgrading is measured in terms of relative wages, demand, wage bill or employment share of tertiary workers.
The effects are large: A one percent increase in import penetration is associated with a five percent increase in relative wages, a two percent increase in the relative wage bill, and a half- and Mexico. Put differently, it is not just the amount of trade but who you trade with that matters-so that imports from countries and industries which are intensive in R&D is a particularly strong impetus for skill upgrading. Earlier work by Machin and Van Reenen (1998) shows that there is a clear association between industry-level R&D intensity and the wage bill for skilled workers in a sample of OECD countries (including Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Sweden, the United States, and the United Kingdom). The results in Table 13 are consistent with a pattern whereby foreign R&D, transmitted through trade, increased the relative wages, employment shares, and demand for tertiary workers in Latin America.
We consider, finally, two alternative explanations for the patterns we observe: Labor market reforms, including falling levels of unionization and an erosion of the real value of the minimum wage, and changes in the relative quality of schooling, in particular decreases in the quality of secondary school relative to university, which could lead to an increase in the relative demand for tertiary equivalents.
Labor market reform as an alternative explanation? The minimum wage could affect the relative earnings of tertiary to secondary equivalents in a number of ways. First, if it is binding, and if at least some secondary equivalents earn low enough wages, the minimum wage could compress the lower end of the distribution of relative earnings. Second, if wages higher up in the distribution are established, at least in part, as multiples of the minimum wage (a so-called numeraire effect), the minimum wage could have an effect on the relative earnings of secondary and tertiary equivalents even if the wages of these more skilled groups are substantially higher than the value of the minimum wage. Third, if the minimum wage serves as a reference point for fair remuneration, even if it is not strictly binding, it could have an effect on the distribution of relative earnings (a so-called lighthouse effect).
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In the spirit of DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) , we consider the effect of the minimum wage with univariate kernel density plots of wages, both for the population as a whole, and for secondary and tertiary equivalents only. 18 These plots suggest that the minimum wage is clearly binding in some countries-Colombia and less obviously Brazil, both for the population as a whole and, to a lesser extent, for the more skilled workers-but not in others-Chile and Mexico (see Bell (1997) for a similar conclusion about differences between Colombia and Mexico based on firm-level data). Figure 6 shows that in Colombia there is substantial piling of mass at the level of the minimum wage, even for secondary and tertiary equivalents, and other spikes higher up in the distribution; some of these coincide with multiples of the minimum wage, suggesting a numeraire effect of the minimum wage. No such patterns are observable in Mexico. Table 14 presents summary estimates of the union membership rates in the five countries in our analysis. 20 A comparison of the rates in Table 14 when we compare the relative earnings of tertiary and secondary equivalents for workers with low (1-10) and high (25+) years of experience, we find no evidence that the increase in earnings associated with schooling is concentrated among younger or older workers-unlike the United
States, where younger, highly educated workers appear to have benefited more than their older counterparts (see Card and Lemieux 2001; Heckman, Lochner, and Todd 1998) . We therefore conclude that changes in the relative quality of schooling are unlikely to help explain much about the evolution of relative earnings in Latin America.
Conclusion
Workers with tertiary education have seen their wages rise steeply in Latin America.
This paper shows that this increase in relative wages has been caused by sharp increases in the demand for these most skilled workers by firms. The bulk of the changes in the wage premium for skilled workers have taken place within detailed industries, and in the same industries in different countries. Both of these are suggestive of an important role for skill-biased technological change. In addition, the relative demand for tertiary equivalents increased in sectors and at times of increasing penetration of R&D intensive imports. The patterns we find are consistent with the transmission of skill-biased technologies from the North to Latin American countries. Labor market reforms may have further compounded these effects. Note: *** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10% GLS regressions with AR(1) in error term, with observations weighted by employment in a countryindustry-year cell. All series are detrended using country-industry specific trends and all regressions include country-sector specific dummies. The sample size for each of the fifteen regressions is 375. Chisquared tests for joint significance of the coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level or better in all specifications. 2 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Year of Survey
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